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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
This issue of Studies in the Anthropology of Visual 
Communication is devoted to a single study which in many 
ways is paradigmatic of the work that this publication and its 
parent Society was designed to encourage and to disseminate. 
I noted in Volume 1 Number 1 that the Editorial Board was 
biased toward actual studies that dealt with visual symbolic 
events in their social and cultural contexts. The Editor's 
Introduction to that issue of Studies also affirmed our desire 
to provide a place where scholars who worked with large 
quantities of pictures could present both the conclusions 
they drew from the pictures and the pictures themselves. 
Studies was never meant to be an illustrated journal in the 
style of the National Geographic. We didn't intend to publish 
pictures as pretty illustrations for "scientific papers." We did 
want to provide a place where pictures, as data, could be 
presented alongside words. 
The monograph by Erving Goffman which makes up this 
issue is to my knowledge the first journal publication 
presenting some five hundred photographs as part of an 
analysis of social ceremony. The study not only reproduces 
the pictures but attempts an extended analysis of how 
pictures themselves, and pictures of social situations can be 
used in scientific research. Because this is the first time that a 
scientific study of social behavior containing so many 
pictures has appeared in a single journal article, it might be 
important to frame and to situate (in Goffman's sense) this 
research within the context of other work analyzing pictures 
of all kinds for a variety of purposes. 
Within social science the work of Bateson and Mead 
(1942), Gesell (1925), and Gesell and Jig (1940) come 
immediately to mind. These studies, however, present ·a 
different kind of photograph than will be encountered in the 
Goffman paper which follows. That is, the earlier studies 
were based upon photos taken by the researchers themselves, 
in the field, in order to study certain social and biological 
events. The photographs they used were not a pictorial 
articulation of a society communicating through pictures, 
but rather a record of human behavior which these scientists 
made, and made available for study. In fact, one of the 
important contributions of that work, particularly of 
Bateson and Mead, was that not only did the researchers 
themselves take the photographs in ways that fit their 
research objectives, but they made the photographs and their 
analysis of them available to all other researchers. This was 
the first time that such a large body of photographs, 
produced and analyzed following the systematic rules of 
social science, had ever been made available to the entire 
scientific community in public-as a publication. It is 
important to note, however, that while Bateson and Mead, 
and others, were themselves concerned with actually photo-
graphing social behavior, the Goffman paper is concerned 
with a different issue, a different use of photography, and a 
different method of analysis. 
In many ways the issues about pictures that concern 
Goffman in this mongraph-and it is important to point out 
that issues about pictures are not the only ones he deals with 
here-revolve around what he calls a "situated social fuss." 
He is concerned with social situations, with social ceremony, 
with the affirmation of basic social arrangements. He finds 
that symbolic events such as weddings, as well as 
advertisements picturing a wedding, allow us to understand 
the nature and the presentation of ultimate doctrines about 
man and the world. It must be noted that not only the 
advertisements he analyzes, but the fact that a noted social 
scientist analyzes them, can equally be understood as part of 
the situated social fuss he is studying. 
This kind of study-of social behavior as seen through a 
symbolic form - has a long tradition in the history of the arts, 
and although shorter, a lively tradition in such fields as 
psychoanalysis and social science. The traditions of art 
history, and of literary criticism, revolve around systems, 
theories, and examples,. of the analysis of individual works 
and aggregates of works by individual "artists," '-'schools of 
artists," "periods," "genres," "styles," and so on. These 
studies, until very recently, were almost all conducted within 
a humanistic framework and did not share any of the 
paradigms of a positivistic scientific framework. Many of 
them, however, whether primarily evaluative, iconographic, 
or interpretive in nature can be understood to deal with 
persons and their place and behavior in society. On that level 
much of the analysis of symbolic events within a humanistic 
tradition can be helpful in clarifying what Goffman conceives 
as the function of ceremony: "the affirmation of basic social 
arrangements and the presentation of ultimate doctrines 
about man and the world." These arrangements and these 
doctrines as presented by the artist were not always clear or 
easy to understand and contextualize. The function of the 
iconographer, historian, or critic, in part, was to situate the 
work or works in question and to point out precisely what as 
well as how they explicated and presented a "picture" of 
man at some particular time and place. It was, of course, 
· commonly accepted within these traditions that novels, 
plays, stories, paintings, and other art forms could be 
analyzed to show what, as well as how, people in different 
periods, classes, and cultures believed about themselves and 
the world they lived in. It was also accepted that although an 
individual artist could and did articulate conventionalized 
social behavior, postures, and events in his works he did not 
have to- nor was it even appropriate to- articulate these 
conventions as rules of social behavior as such. Artists 
presented society, they were not forced to analyze it as well. 
Theories about how to articulate the rules of human and 
social behavior, and theories about whether most people 
know, or could know most of the rules that governed their 
behavior have recently been the center of much interest and 
controversy. Whether we can articulate "grammar" even 
though we speak "correctly," whether we know or can know 
why we "love" even though we are "in love," and whether 
we can articulate the rules of weddings, eating in restaurants, 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 65 
or greeting our family and friends are problems that today 
have become central to our search for an understanding of 
our own behavior. What is held in common by the art 
historian, the literary critic, the linguist, and increasingly by 
other social scientists, is the belief that through the study of 
how we articulate in a variety of symbolic modes will come a 
fuller understanding of how we structure and situate 
ourselves in the world. In the sense that Goffman's paper is 
about, the way we present ourselves (and accept ourselves as 
presented) in a certain kind of picture-an ad-can tell us 
about some of basic social arrangements. In that sense, the 
v "grammar" of ads may reflect the "grammar" of social 
arrangements, and the rules governing how women in ads are 
shown in relation to men may tell us how our society 
structures the concept of Gender. 
In recent years this kind of analysis has often been labeled 
content analysis. When Freud (191 0) published his analysis 
of one of Leonardo da Vinci's paintings, he felt that he was 
merely extending his theories about human behavior to the 
behavior of great, as well as, ordinary men. He argues that 
the same psychological principles should hold for all men, 
and felt compelled to defend himself against the charge that 
he was demeaning the great by resorting to the kind of 
psychoanalysis applied only to the "sick." Freud, although 
he is not often thought of as a social analyst, realized that an 
analy~ ! s of what people believed- whether those beliefs were 
true or false in a scientific sense- could be used in the 
analysis of social as well as personal behavior. In justifying 
his use of anecdote in his analysis of da Vinci he wrote, "and 
even if this story of Vasari's has neither external nor much 
internal probability but belongs to the legend which began to 
be woven around the mysterious Master even before his 
death, it is still of incontestable value as evidence of what 
men believed at the time" (my italics). 
Erik Erikson (1950), based on iconographic methods 
developed for the analysis of paintings and filtered through a 
Freudian framework that argued that evidence of what men 
believed could be found in autobiographies of popular heroes 
as well as films made about the lives of such men, used the 
Soviet film Childhood of Gorky to develop an analysis of 
Russian psychological character. Erikson's method has 
subsequently been labeled psychohistory rather than content 
psychoanalysis and has been employed by an increasing 
number of researchers in studies relating personal to large 
scale social behavior and events. 
By the time of World War II a small group of social 
scientists in several countries had realized that an analysis of 
symbolic productions such as speeches, books, stories, 
movies, and cartoons produced in a particular society and 
widely disseminated therein, could be used as evidence of 
popular belief. Not only could these symbolic events be used 
as evidence of what people believed but they could be used 
as evidence of what political leaders wanted people to 
believe. Harold Lasswell and a small group of political 
scientists set about analyzing the speeches of German 
political leaders. In 1945 Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and 
a group of their colleagues began work on what became the 
first large-scale comparative analysis of the symbolic mass 
media productions of other cultures (Mead and Metraux 
1953). They called their work cultural analysis. 
Later Nathan Leites and Martha Wolfenstein (1950), who 
had worked in the original Culture at a Distance Project, 
attempted a large-scale comparative analysis of the most 
popular films of England, France, and the United States. In 
many ways their work can lead us directly to the kind of 
study so differently developed by Goffman. 
Wolfenstein and Leites argued that "where a group of 
people share a common culture, they are likely to have 
certain daydreams in common. We talk, for example, of the 
American dream ... and the acquisition of gleaming cars and 
iceboxes ... " In that context the authors of the study 
discuss the new types of heroes and heroines that appear in 
the mass media and whose images come to life. They argue 
that their analysis of movies will, for example, allow them to 
gain insight into such things as a culture's ideas about "the 
ideal girl." " ... numerous young men (will) see how the girl 
who fits their half-formulated wishes looks and talks and 
how she behaves with her man." 
Since the 1940s there have been many analyses of this 
kind, seeking to find common patterns of heroes, villians, 
family life, violence, and other examples arising out of "the 
recurrent daydreams which enter into the consciousness of 
millions ... " (Wolfenstein and Leites). Most recently George 
Gerbner (1972-76) has developed a concept which he 
describes as an analysis of cultural indicators, in which he 
analyzes mass media productions ranging from confession 
magazines and comic books to prime time television, in an 
attempt to describe and to assign social meaning to those 
messages that are recurrently being disseminated through the 
mass media. 
While framing Goffman's work within the tradition of 
Freud and of cultural and content analysis it is necessary- as 
it is with all frames-to realize that the frame is in Goffman's 
terms, "a small scale spatial metaphor ... (a place within 
which) mythic historic events are played through in a 
condensed and idealized version." In the tradition of Freud 
as well as Durkheim, Goffman believes that his analysis of 
what is frequently overlooked as a trivial social event serves 
to uncover a great deal of social life that is ordinarily hidden 
in unformulated courses of activity and experience. Going 
further, Goffman in this study is arguing that certain kinds of 
social pictures provide us with glimpses of these condensed 
and idealized versions of mythic historic events and give the 
individual "an opportunity to face directly a representa-
tion ... a mock up of what he is supposed to hold dear, a 
presentation of the supposed ordering of his existence." 
This study can be understood as being in several frames at 
the same time. On one level it can be understood as a study 
of ceremony, on another as a study of pictures. As a study of 
ceremony it is about special ceremonies called advertisements 
which tend to describe how society structures itself. As a 
study of pictures it is about a special kind of picturing 
ceremony which Goffman calls "social portraiture" through 
which a society expresses itself. As Goffman sees it, these 
social portraits are both the substance and the shadow of 
social life. While earlier analysts took for granted the 
distincti·on between a picture and that which it depicts, 
Goffman tends to show the connection between the two; to 
emphasize the complex relationship between everyday 
ceremonial behaviors and such symbolic representations of 
these behaviors as pictures. 
Another frame through which Goffman's analysis of these 
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social portraits must be looked at is the frame of the 
ethologist. Here Goffman presents two seemingly contradic-
tory frames at the same time. He presents the concepts of 
. ceremony and ritual as being primarily social arrangements, 
while at the same time presenting the ethologist's concept of 
ritual and ritual expression as a form of "species utilitarian 
display" that serves to regulate social life from a biologically 
determined base. Here the double frame becomes important 
since it allows Goffman to distinguish between communica-
tion behavior and other forms of social arrangements. He 
recognizes that patterns of behavior may tell us certain things 
about society-may inform us as witnesses-without com-
municating.1 As he puts it "Displays don't communicate in 
the narrow sense of the term; they don't enunciate 
something through a language of symbols openly established 
and used solely for that purpose." Goffman's bringing 
together of the view that some symbolic behavior is social 
with the view that some symbolic or ritual behavior is genetic 
or biological forces us to examine the intentional or 
meaningful nature of the social forces that he talks about. 
In the section entitled "Picture Frames" Goffman then 
addresses many of the questions related to the nature of 
photographs as expressions, evidence, and truth statements 
about social "reality." Here he lays aside questions of the 
hidden nature of the material he is dealing with, and is 
willing to take the difficult position that the camera both 
fakes what is before it and that what is before the camera 
doesn't allow one to fake. He thus bravely tackles the core 
issues of camera truth and camera structure. The issue then 
gets further complicated because he is dealing with concepts 
about the structure of social reality (or the pattern he 
discerns as social reality) and the very act of structuring 
reality by symbolic means. 
In dealing with the special kind of picture used in 
advertisements as well as something as basic to social 
organization as gender, Goffman is forced to face the 
difference between certain intentionally created symbolic 
fusses meant to communicate- such as photographs in 
advertisemen.ts-and social behaviors and arrangements that 
may organize or help to -organize social life but are not yet 
openly established enough to become conventionalized 
communicative symbols. He recognizes that models may be 
shown in photographs. in a way that is systematically 
different from the way they might deploy themselves when 
not before a camera. In explicating this duality-that people 
can behave so as to appear in pictures in ways that they never 
behave in "real life"-G.offman develops the term 
instantiation, or instance record. He sees clearly that a 
picture is an instance record of an event before the camera. It 
can at best prove that such goings on as are shown can be 
performed. An instance record, he points out, is not 
necessarily an inst2.nce of social practice in "real life." What 
one can understand, however, is that many such advertise-
ments are a body of instance records of another kind of 
social practice-a symbolic practice. By showing the nature 
of pictures and by examining how certain kinds of pictures 
show or portray the world we learn some of the regularities 
of the situated social fusses we make about things. 
Goffman adds another important concept to our under-
standing of pictures and the "real world." It is his constant 
emphasis on the duality of relationship between what a 
picture is and what it is of that helps us to see how the way 
we behave is colored by the way we interpret pictures of the 
way we behave, and that conversely, the way we make 
pictures of behavior is colored by the way we interpret 
behavior. In this connection he introduces the concept of 
glimpsing. 
Here, in a tradition that can be traced back to Harry Stack 
Sullivan in psychiatry, Goffman points out that what we see 
of people in social situations is only a glimpse of the 
outside-the public as opposed to the private self-and that 
from thes~ glimpses of a social person we construct a social 
reality. The psychological, personal reality most often not 
only remains hidden, but often is not needed for our 
understanding of the social behavior in question . His example 
of the young couple in a jewelry store presenting a "picture" 
of young marrieds, or about-to-be marrieds, shopping for a 
ring while in fact whiling away some time before going to the 
Fellini movie down the block, raises the all important issue 
of the "truth" of social reality. For Goffman is implying that 
the way we behave when we can be glimpsed depends in large 
part on the way we want our social selves to be understood: 
that we all know how certain behaviors will be interpreted 
and that we all both act and interpret in that way. Goffman's 
position is subtle and complex. He is telling us that 
advertisers pose their models so that when we see their ads 
we interpret them as we would glimpses of social behavior. 
That these pictures capitalize on conventionalized portraiture 
rules for "maleness," "strength," "wife," "sexy," 'rich," and 
so on. At the same time, he implies, we must understand that 
advertisers and other people engaged in acts of communica-
tion can do so only within the frameworks of social behavior. 
That in fact social behavior itself is the act of posing for the 
glimpse~ of observers. 
There is no doubt of the cogency of Goffman's reflections 
about the nature of social behavior and of a picture's 
articulation of specific glimpses of that behavior for 
communicative purposes by a picture maker. The question 
that Goffman then must face is the nature of his own 
analysis of these pictures. As laymen, as ordinary social 
creatures, we must be satisfied with the socially situated 
glimpse. But what about the analyst? Is he glimpsing-taking 
a quick look at these pictures and making some off-the-cuff 
comments on the society they portray in terms of the same 
set of social conventions under which the pictures were also 
produced-or is he doing something different; something 
deeper, and more "scientific?" Goffman's analysis implies 
the question. Future studies may be able to supply some 
answers. 
In the third section of this study Goffman tackles the 
problems facing the social analyst in the analysis of pictures. 
He faces questions of sample and sample size, the ability to 
generalize from certain groups of data, questions of "truth" 
and "realism" in pictures, and some of the central 
methodological problems in the social sciences; the problems 
of discovery, presentation, and proof. He argues that working 
with photographs allows one to exploit the very special 
advantages they have in the process of discovery and 
presentation of material about social behavior. 
This section, in which the pictures he has assembled are 
embedded, contains one of the few instances that I have seen 
of an open presentation of the pros and cons of an analytic 
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method. He discusses how he believes pictures can and can't 
be used in social analysis. He outlines a series of arguments 
showing why the method he uses is valuable, as well as a 
series of arguments detailing why one shouldn't pay much 
attention to it. He sums up much of the argument current 
today in social science revolving around the study of a 
certain kind of photography used as a datum of social 
analysis. Much of his argument is, in my opinion, valid for 
most other kinds of communicational symbolic events. The 
analysis of films, television, novels, plays, comic books, and a 
wide variety of mass produced material can also be analyzed 
as social portraiture and will, I feel sure, benefit greatly from 
this fully documented section dealing with Goffman's own 
methodology. 
It is finally necessary to clarify two other frames which 
are important to Goffman as well as to most analysts of 
society. One frame is bounded by what we may define as 
"out there," a natural world in which we assume our social 
space and activities exist and take place. Another frame is 
bounded by our own articulations of that space and 
behavior; by what we say, picture, write and otherwise 
symbolize in the complex modes, media, and codes in which 
we have learned to structure our universe. It is important to 
understand that these two frames are not mutally con-
tradictory or exclusive, and that pictures can be employed 
for analysis using both frames. In some cases the problem is 
to produce pictures which can be used as evidence of certain 
events, as instance-events, as evidence that Mr. X was in a 
certain place doing certain things, or as a record of the way 
we observed certain behaviors with a camera. In other cases 
the problem is to examine pictures that have already been 
produced for a variety of purposes: by politicians running for 
office, by advertisers trying to sell beauty creams, by 
"artists" giving us examples of their structures of the world. 
Both, in a way, are in Goffman's sense of the term, social 
portraits. The differences, I believe, are differences of scale, 
of level, of analytic activity attempted. It would be missing 
much of the point of Goffman's analysis of how pictures can 
be used in social analysis to take this study as an argument 
for one picture frame opposed to another. 
The point, I think, is not what kind of pictures one 
makes, or what kind of pictures one analyses. The point must 
be the kind of analysis one makes. I believe it would be most 
fruitful to consider this study as an example of an important 
kind of situated social fuss one good analyst can generate 





1 For a fuller explanation of a concept of communication which 
makes explicit the distinctions between communication and in-
teraction, between informing and attributing and implying and 
inferring, see Worth and Gross (1974 ). 
REFERENCES CITED 
Bateson, G., and M. Mead 
1942 Balinese Character. New York: New York Academy of 
Sciences. 
Erikson, E. 
1950 Childhood and Society. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Freud, S. 
1910 Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood. New 
York: W. W. Norton. 
Gerbner, G. 
1972 Communication and Social Environment. Scientific Ameri-
can 227:153-160. 
Gerner, G., and L. Gross 
1976 Living with Television: The Violence Profile. journal of 
Communication 26(2): 173-199. 
Gesell, A. 
1925 Mental Growth of the Pre-School Child. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Gesell, A., and F. llg 
1940 The First Five Years of Life. New York: Harper and Bros. 
Leites, N., and M. Wolfenstein 
1950 Movies: A Psychological Study. Glencoe, IL: The Free . 
Press. 
Mead, M., and R. Metraux 
1953 The Study of Culture at a Distance. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Worth, S., and L. Gross 
1 9 7 4 Symbolic Strategies. journal of Communication 
24(4):27-39. 
nB STUDII=S IN Tbli; ANTI-U~OPOI nr..v nt: \/1~111\1 l'ni\AI\IIIII\.III'ATinl\1 
